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NOTES
DEREGULATING THE TRANSMISSION OF ELECTRICITY:
WHEELING UNDER P.U.R.P.A. SECTIONS 203, 204,
AND 205
INTRODUCTION
In the past twenty-five years, several conditions have prompted the
development of small independent power producers (I.P.P.'s).1 The
Arab oil embargo in the mid-70s, coupled with the inflationary costs of
expanding and maintaining the generating capacity of prior years re-
sulted in skyrocketing fuel costs.2 Further, because of the escalating
costs associated with constructing a large generation plant as well as the
negative environmental implications of traditional electricity generation,3
1. Small independent power producers include, but are not limited to, small facilities that
employ renewable resources such as hydro-electric energy, wood energy, geothermal energy or bio-
mass as a primary fuel. See generally Oppedahl & Tardurvo, Wind Energy Conversion, 5 HIAR.
ENvTL. L. REV. 431 (1981) (discussing wind turbine generation systems); Huss, Richmond &
Badger, Alternative Generation Technologies Can They Compete?, PUB. UTIL. FORT., Mar. 15, 1984,
at 17, 21 (discussing production of solar power).
In the United States, there are approximately 3500 electric utilities. The public (local and federal)
owns the vast majority-2,255. The publicly owned utilities account for 13.5% of the total custom-
ers and 16.4% of total kilowatt hour sales of the countrys' electric utility industry. Comment, A
Proposal to Increase Access to Electric Transmission Services, 20 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 227, 228 (1983)
(citing OFFICE OF ELEC. POWER REGULATIONS, U.S. FED. ENERGY REGULATIONS COMMISSION,
Power Pooling in the United States 5 (1981)). Although the public owns most utilities, privately
owned utilities generate the most electricity. A mere 284 of these concerns serve 77.1% of all cus-
tomers and account for 78.2% of total K.W.H. sales in the United States. Generally, private stock-
holders and holding companies own these utilities. A. FINDER, THE STATES AND ELECTRIC
UTILITY REGULATION 5-6 (1977) (citing FEDERAL POWER COMMISSION, STATISTICS OF INVESTOR
OWNED UTILITIES IN THE UNITED STATES (1975)). Perhaps the least significant generator owners
are cooperatives. These account for 9.4% of all customers and 5.5% of the total K.W.H. sales. Id.
2. Hamilton, Standard Contracts and Prices for Small Power Producers, 11 WM. MITCHELL L.
REV. 421, 422 (1985).
3. See generally Davis, Kurtock, Leape & Magill, The Clean Air Act Amendments of 1977:
Away From Technolgy Forcing?, 2 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 1, 68-89 (1977); Del Duca, The Clean Air
Act: A Realistic Assessment of Cost-Effectiveness, 5 HARV. ENvTL. L. REV. 184, 196-203 (1981);
Flax, Radioactive Waste Management, 5 HARV. ENVTL L. REV. 259, 259-95 (1981); Freidland, The
New Hazardous Waste Management System: Regulation of Wastes or Wasted Regulation?, 5 HARV.
ENVTL. L. REv. 89, 89-130 (1981); Green, Sulfur Emission and Acid Rain: A Least-Cost Approach to
the Problem, PUB. UTIL. FORT., Dec. 8, 1983 at 46; Trisko, Acid Precipitation: Causes, Consequences,
Controls, PUB. UTIL. FORT., Feb. 3, 1983 at 19; The Acid-Rain Stalemate, ELECTRICAL WORLD,
Dec. 1983 at 9.
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utilities had little incentive to build large generating plants.4
Congress responded to the energy crisis of the 70s by passing President
Carter's comprehensive National Energy Plan.5 One section, the Public
Utility Regulatory Policies Act (P.U.R.P.A.)6 required utilities to
purchase cogenerated power.7 By passing P.U.R.P.A., Congress meant
to decentralize the production of power, thereby making it easier for
small power producers to enter the market.' The ultimate congressional
4. P. JosKow & R. SCHMALENSEE, MARKETS FOR POWER, AN ANALYSIS OF ELECTRIC
UTILITY DEREGULATION 223-24 & n.12 (1983).
Past practice has been to increase the pace of new power plant construction, but discouraging
economic and regulatory developments have made some utilities reluctant to embark upon a new
wave of plant construction. Instead, they are examining energy generating alternatives in an attempt
to scale back demand projections and defer the need for expensive new power plants. Smartt, Utili-
ties Found to be Interested in Energy Alternatives, PUB. UTIL. FORT., Nov. 10, 1983 at 4. See also
Ray, The Megawatt Debate, ELECTRICAL WORLD, Oct. 1983 at 4 (estimating that the cost for con-
struction of generating plants needed to satisfy growing demand for electricity by 2000 would exceed
one trillion dollars in 1982 dollars).
5. The National Energy Plan contained five laws, four of which were the Energy Tax Act of
1978, Pub. L. No. 96-618, 92 Stat. 3174 (codified in scattered sections of 26 U.S.C. (1982)); the
National Energy Conservation Policy Act, Pub. L. No. 95-619, 92 Stat. 3206 (codified in scattered
sections of 42 U.S.C. and 12 U.S.C. (1982)); the Power Plant and Industrial Fuel Use Act of 1978,
Pub. L. No. 95-620, 92 Stat. 3289 (codified in 40 U.S.C. §§ 872-877, 885 and scattered sections of 16
U.S.C. (1982)); and the Natural Gas Policy Act, Pub. L. No. 95-621, 92 Stat. 3351 (codified in 15
U.S.C. §§ 3301-3432 (1982)).
6. The fifth law of the National Energy Plan was the Public Utility Regulatory Policies Act of
1978 (P.U.R.P.A.), Pub. L. No. 95-617, 92 Stat. 3117 (codified in scattered sections of 16 U.S.C. and
15 U.S.C. (1982)).
7. Cogeneration is the simultaneous production of two forms of energy. The most common
relationship is between electricity and process steam. Utilities produce heat and power by the se-
quential use of energy from one fuel source-the reject heat of one process becomes the energy input
into a subsequent process. Comment, A Look at Federal & State Cogeneration and Small Power
Production Regulations, 3 J. ENERGY L. & POL'Y 29, 329-33, (1982).
8. Congress characterized the insecurity of the U.S. oil supply as a "fundamental" problem.
Initially, Congress cited the oil-trade deficit as prompting reconsideration of its energy policies, The
importation of fuel rose between 45% and 50% from 23% in only seven years (1970 to 1977).
Congress also considered the twofold increase of U.S. demand (from 8.5 to 17.4 million barrels per
day (m.m.b.d.)) as further evidence of the need for energy policy reevaluations. In addition, the
Federal Energy Administration predicted oil demand would rise from 17.4 m.m.b.d. in 1976 to 21.1
m.m.b.d. in 1980, to 22.8 m.m.b.d. in 1986 and 24.9 m.m.b.d. in 1990. Given the increased depen-
dence on foreign oil, this increased consumption suggested that imports would reach 10.2 m,m.b.d.
in 1980 (48% of consumption), 11.5 m.m.b.d. in 1985 (58% of consumption), and 14.5 m.m.b.d. in
1990 (58% of consumption). H.R. REP. No. 543, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 6, reprinted in 1978 U.S.
CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 7673, 7673-74. Congress stated that "such an increase in our reli-
ance on oil imports would greatly constrain our foreign policy and could do considerable damage to
our economy." Id. The House report mentioned that in addition to the rising prices, the world oil
market would be extremely scarce by the mid-1980s. Id. at 7675.
Congress also outlined major themes and specific goals of P.U.R.P.A. The three themes were
energy conservation, conversion to coal, and incentives to production. The six goals were: 1) to
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol67/iss2/6
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goal was to diminish American dependence on foreign oil. 9
Although Congress wrote a pervasive statutory scheme aimed at de-
regulating the electricity industry, it failed to give the Federal Energy
Regulatory Commission (F.E.R.C.) and the various State Public Utilities
Commissions (P.U.C.'s) the requisite authority to foster an efficient com-
petitive market. "0 This Note will critically evaluate the pertinent provi-
sions of P.U.R.P.A., as well as how Congress could amend P.U.R.P.A.
to achieve its stated goal." Amending the statue is necessary because,
given the history and the nature of the electricity industry, neither the
F.E.R.C. nor industrial states possess the proper authority to require one
utility to "wheel"' 2 on behalf of another.
I. HISTORY
Before discussing P.U.R.P.A.'s deregulation and the events giving rise
to it, an understanding of the nature of the industry prior to regulation is
necessary: one must be wary of deregulation that nurtures the same envi-
ronment giving rise to the regulation in the first instance.
A. The Electricity Industry-A Primer
Unlike coal, natural gas, and oil, electricity is a manufactured form of
energy.' 3 While the discovery of electricity occurred in the 1500s," it
did not become a popular source of energy until the 1880s.11 The basic
reduce the average growth rate of energy consumption to 2% per annum; 2) to reduce the oil im-
ports level to less than six million m.m.b.d.; 3) to achieve a 10% reduction in gasoline consumption
from the 1977 level; 4) to retrofit for energy conservation purposes 90% of the residential and com-
mercial buildings in the United States; 5) to increase coal production by at least 400 million tons
annually over 1976 levels; and 6) to use solar energy in more than two and a half million homes. See
L. BUCK & L. GOODWIN, ALTERNATIVE ENERGY: THE FEDERAL ROLE 7-11 (1982); Federal
Energy Regulatory Commission Final Rule (for P.U.R.P.A. regulations) 18 C.F.R. § 292.301 to 602
(1984).
9. See supra note 8.
10. See infra notes 85-91 and accompanying text.
11. See infra notes 76-150 and accompanying text.
12. Wheeling is a method of transferring electric power. See infra note 56 and accompanying
text.
13. W. Fox, FEDERAL REGULATION OF ENERGY 749 (1983).
14. Although the Greeks were the first to discover electric phenomena, Wiliam Gilbert is re-
garded as the first serious student of electricity. He studied the relation of static electricity to mag-
netism in the 1500s. 4 ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA 429 (15th ed. 1986).
15. Two events gave rise to the increased use of electricity. The first was an exhibition by
Zenabe Grame in 1873 in which he proved that electricity could be transmitted from one place to
another by overhead conductors. This event, combined with Thomas A. Edison's invention of the
1989]
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process by which electricity is manufactured has remained unchanged
since that time. 16 A primary fossil fuel is burned which produces heat,
which in turn produces steam. The steam is then pumped into a turbine
which rotates a generator, and the generator produces electricity.1
7
The advent of commercial transformers changed the electricity indus-
try and was pivotal in the development of alternating current. Commer-
cial transformers also expedited the transmission and distribution of
high-voltage electricity to larger areas at greater distances, thereby in-
creasing the supply of electricity. Demand rose commensurately, and the
electricity industry soon became essential to the economic development
of the country. ' 8
. History of the Electricity Industry in the United States
In the early 1900s, electric utilities obtained long term franchises1 9
from cities and states. Governments encouraged the development of util-
ities by offering substantial tax breaks, bond guarantees, and land
grants.2" These franchises gave electric utilities the authority to provide
service in all or part of the grantor's jurisdiction. Before the develop-
ment of high voltage distribution systems, generators were small and
competition for franchises intense, thereby decreasing the cost of electric-
ity.21 The fierce competition among firms, therefore, served the public
interest.
One major weakness in the industry's development was the unprofit-
ability of serving rural areas. Because there were substantially more cus-
tomers in a city block of New York City than in the same space in rural
Kansas, it was much more profitable to serve the New York market than
the Kansas market. When electricity entrepreneurs eventually did serve
the rural areas, the service was inconsistent and inefficient and blackouts
incandescent lamp in 1879 and his construction of the first central power station and distribution
system in New York City in 1881, generally marks the introduction of electricity into homes, busi-
nesses, and factories. Id. at 430.
16. W. Fox, supra note 13, at 750.
17. Id.
18. A. FINDER, supra note 1, at 3; see also P. JOSKOW & R. SCHMALENSEE, supra note 4 at 3-
4.
19. A franchise in the legal sense is a government grant to perform a service or function not
available to the general public. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 592 (5th ed. 1979). See also A. FINDER,
supra note 1, at 3.
20. A. FINDER, supra note 1, at 3.
21. Id.
[Vol. 67:435
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and brownouts were more prevalent in rural than in urban areas.22 This
inefficiency of the system was one of the factors prompting Congress to
enter the field.23
In 1920 Congress passed the Federal Power Act.2 4 The Act's purpose,
however, was not to encourage a more equitable division of electricity. 25
Rather, the Act only gave the Federal Power Commission (F.P.C.) au-
thority to license hydroelectric power plants on the major rivers of the
United States.26 During Franklin Roosevelt's administration Congress
created Part II of the Federal Power Act27 and gave the F.P.C. the addi-
tional power to regulate the transmission of electric energy.28
Congress delegated to the F.P.C. the authority to regulate the inter-
state sale of power for two reasons. First, given the monopolistic nature
of the industry, Congress hoped to keep prices down. Second, Congress
wanted to ensure adequate electrical service nationwide.29 Although
Congress originally gave the F.P.C. jurisdiction over the transmission of
electricity, demand generally met supply, obviating the need for F.P.C.
22. S. BREYER & P. MACAVoY, ENERGY REGULATION BY THE FEDERAL POWER COMMIS-
SION 1-4 (1974).
23. See, eg., INTERSTATE MOVEMENT OF ELECTRIC ENERGY, S. Doc. No. 238, 71st Cong.,
3rd Sess. (1931); ELECTRIC LIGHT & POWER IN WAIMEA AND KEKAHA, Hawaii, S. Rep. No. 378,
70th Cong., 1st Sess. (1928); UTILITY CORPORATIONS, S. Doc. No. 92, pts 1-76, 70th Cong. 1st Sess.
(1928) (investing performance of utilities nationwide); ELECTRIC POWER INDUSTRY SUPPLY OF
ELECTRICAL EQUIPMENT AND COMPETITIVE CONDITIONS, S. Doe. No. 46, 70th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1928); ELECTRIC POWER INDUSTRY CONTROL OF POWER COMPANIES S. Doc. No. 213, 69th
Cong., 2nd Sess. (1927).
24. 16 U.S.C. §§ 791a-828c (1982).
25. In 1902, Congress passed the Reclamation Act ch. 1093, 32 Stat. 38 (1902). The Act's
major goal was to irrigate the desert lands in the West by constructing dams. Although the dams
produced electricity, it was several years before anyone thought to sell the valuable byproduct. W.
Fox, supra note 13, at 754.
26, W. Fox, supra note 13, at 754; see also supra note 25.
27. 16 U.S.C. § 824-8241 (1982). Section 824 (b)(1) provides in pertinent part:
(1) The provisions of this subchapter shall apply to the transmission of electric energy in
interstate commerce and to the sale of electric energy at wholesale in interstate commerce,
but except as provided in paragraph (2) shall not apply to any other sale of electric energy
or deprive a State or State commission of its lawful authority now exercised over the expor-
tation of hydroelectric energy which is transmitted across a State line. The Commission
shall have jurisdiction over all facilities for such transmission or sale of electric energy, but
shall not have jurisdiction, except as specifically provided ... over facilities used for the
generation of electric energy or over facilities used in local distribution or only for the
transmission of electric energy in intrastate commerce ....
28. See supra note 27. Congress had concluded that the business of transmitting and selling
electricity affected the public interest. See supra note 27. The F.P.C. could, therefore, regulate the
transmission of electric energy under its power to regulate interstate commerce. The F.P.C. also
regulated the sale of wholesale electricity.
29. S. BREYER & P. MACAVOY, supra note 22, at 2.
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regulation in this area. The F.P.C. thus rarely exercised its authority to
regulate transmission of electricity. 30 After the New York City blackout
of 1965, however, the F.P.C. began to review the delivery of electric
power. The agency concluded that its authority under the Federal Power
Act was limited to the physical interconnection of transmission lines, not
the movement of electricity over those lines.3
During the early to mid-1970s, a number of factors threatened the fi-
nancial viability of many utilities.32 The 1973 Arab oil embargo, as well
as the collapse of public utilities' investments in nuclear generators, re-
sulted in a consumer rate shock. Rates rose from two cents per kilowatt
hour in 1970 to three cents in 1973.33 As electricity became increasingly
more expensive, demand sharply decreased.34 State commissions, previ-
ously the vanguard of the utilities, began to align with the consumer.
Simultaneously, large industrial customers began generating their own
electricity.35 Consumers, large and small, grew dissatisfied with the ser-
vice of the utilities.
II. THE STRUCTURE OF THE ELECTRIC INDUSTRY
The electric industry is divided into three stages: generation,3 6 trans-
mission37 and distribution.38 Before one can evaluate critically the legis-
lative response to the problems identified above, one must be familiar
30. See W. Fox, supra note 13 at 755.
31. Breyer & MacAvoy, The Federal Power Commission and the Coordination Problem in the
Electrical Power Industry, 46 S. CAL. L. REV. 661, 698-99 (1973).
32. See, eg., In re Consumers Power Company, 68 Pub. Util. Rep. 4th (PUR) 42 (grappling
with the potential bankruptcy of Consumers Power); Cuomo Backs Public Power for Long Island,
Reform of State Public Service Commission, 14 Energy Users Rep. (BNA) 34 (Jan. 16, 1986) (report-
ing that New York governor supports public takeover of financially troubled Long Island Lighting
Co.). See generally Sponseller, Utility Bankruptcy: A Negative Option?, Pun. UTIL. FORT., Feb. 6,
1986, at 53 (discussing utility commission reactions to problems of near-bankrupt utilities); Sponsel-
ler, Federal Securities Law and the Need to Disclose the Risk of Cancelling Nuclear Plant, PUB. UTL.
FORT., Nov. 8, 1984, at 62 (identifying five utilities whose financial viability is in jeopardy); Woren-
klein & Gerstell, Public Utility Bankruptcy: Lessons for Management and Creditors, Pun. UTIL.
FORT., Dec. 6, 1984, at 26 (describing several utilities as "teetering on the brink").
33. See supra note 2. See also New York- Shoreham-Related Rate Request Filed, PUB. UTIL.
FORT., June 23, 1983, at 49 (reporting a request for a 56.5% rate increase over three years); High
Rate Requests Spread Out Costs of Plants, New Orleans Times-Picayune, Sept. 11, 1983, § 1 at 20,
col. 1 (reporting that New Orleans area's two utilities requested rate increases of 48% to 97%).
34. See W. Fox, supra note 13, at 755.
35. Id.
36. See infra notes 49-55 and accompanying text.
37. See infra notes 56-61 and accompanying text.
38. See infra notes 62-70 and accompanying text.
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with all three industry functions, as well as the economic principles com-
mon to the electricity business.39
A. Economics
At one time, electricity was an economy of scale industry.' When
Congress first attempted to regulate the industry all three aspects of the
industry were "natural monopolies."41 This means that as production
increased, the marginal cost (the cost to produce one more additional
unit) decreased. Therefore, one firm could more easily spread its costs
across a finite amount of sales than if two firms divided the market. In
the early 1900s, state and local governments realized the natural monop-
olistic nature of the electricity business and thus that the most economi-
cal way to manufacture electricity was to allow one entity to
manufacture power.42 Governments reacted by granting monopolistic
franchises of electricity generation and distribution, and justified them as
being in the customer's best interest.43 The finite number of franchises
also curbed the widespread construction of generation plants. Because
there were lower overall costs in the manufacture of electricity, the pub-
lic utilities passed this savings to the consumer.'
In addition to the officially sanctioned monopolies, the capital inten-
sive nature of the industry has also hindered new investment. To con-
39. For a comprehensive and thorough discussion of how F.E.R.C. sets rates, see Small, A
FERC Electric Rate Primer, 5 ENERGY L.J. 197 (1984).
40. See infra notes 40-47 and accompanying text.
Economies of scale tend to account for the downsloping of an average total cost curve. As a
plant's site increases, many variables result in lowered average costs of production. The variables
contributing the most to this economic phenomenon are:
a) Labor Specialization-If a plant is large enough, the management may divide workers into
distinct job functions, thereby allowing each worker to specialize at one task.
b) Managerial Specialization-Just as a plant laborer is able to specialize, so will its manage-
ment. A manager could supervise an extra ten or fifteen employees with no increase in administra-
tive cost.
c) Efficient capital-In some industries (electricity included) the most complex and efficient
manufacturing units are the most expensive. Additionally, maximizing the efficiency of the equip-
ment requires a high level of production.
d) By-Products-A large manufacturing process will, of course, produce by-products. In the
electricity industry, the best example is the steam produced by a co-generator. C. MCCONNELL,
ECONOMICS 500-01 (5th ed. 1981).
41. See P. JOSKOW & R. SCHMALENSEE, supra note 4, at 29-34, 144. Cf Pym & Sussmann,
Antitrust and Electric Utility Regulation, 28 ANTrrRusT BULL. 69, 71 (1983).
42. See P. JOSKOW & R. SCHMALENSEE, supra note 4, at 29-34
43. Id.
44. Id.
1989]
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struct a generator with the capacity to serve an area large enough to earn
any appreciable profit costs hundreds of millions of dollars.45 Further,
this capital expenditure is a "sunken cost."'4 6 If demand is insufficient to
meet the supply of a generator, the investor cannot simply pick up the
plant and move it to another location where the supply/demand dynam-
ics will better accommodate a new generation facility. Moreover, trans-
mission and facilities also involve extensive sunken costs. 47 In addition
to the deterrant effect of these expenditures, there is also a spatial limit4"
to constructing electric lines; utilities cannot simply construct lines wher-
ever they want.
. Generation of Power
Generation is the actual production of electricity.49 A utility reaches
the economy of scales at an output of 10,000 megawatts.50 The total
generating capacity of the entire United States is approximately
640,000,000 megawatts. 5" It appears, therefore, that if one uses the rele-
vant market as the entire nation, electricity generation is not necessarily
a natural monopoly.52 In theory, the United States could easily accom-
modate 64,000 power plants. Even if, however, one measures the market
only in regions, electricity still is not a natural monopoly, because a large
region could support several generators.5 3
Electricity generation is no longer a natural monopoly.5 4 If electricity
45. See Annual T&D Construction Survey, ELECTICAL WORLD 93 (Sept. 1988); Annual Genera.
tion Contruction Survey, ELECTRICAL WORLD 45 (Jan. 1988).
46. See P. JOSKOW & R. SCHMALENSEE, supra note 4, at 65.
47. Id
48. Id. at 63-65.
49. Investor-owned utilities attribute approximately 50% of service costs and 80% of operation
and maintenance costs to generation. Id. at 45. The public utilities argue that electricity is expen-
sive to manufacture because of the unpredictability of demand. Id. For example, the amount of
electricity used during a hot summer day is not the same as on a cool spring night.
50. P. JASKOW & R. SCHMALENSEE, supra note 4, at 45.
51. Id. at 237 n.l.
52. See supra note 41-42 and accompanying text.
53. See J. ACTON & S. BESEN, THE ECONOMICS OF BULK POWER EXCHANGES 43 (1985).
54. Ironically, until the 1970s, electric rates continually declined because of enhanced technolo-
gies, economies of scale and expanding markets. See Joskow, Inflation and Environmental Concern:
Structural Change in the Process of Public Utility Price Regulation, 17 J. L. & ECON. 291, 305-11
(1974). Faulty governmental regulation has played a major role in the decline of the electricity
industry. See Pierce, The Regulatory Treatment of Mistakes in Retrospect: Cancelled Plants and
Excess Capacity, 132 U. PA. L. REv. 497 (1984) (regulatory provision of investment decisions and
rate led to decline of industry).
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could be sold to wider service areas, then a larger market would exist for
that power. If utilities could sell more energy, they could attain a lower
marginal cost at lower output levels relative to the overall capacity of the
generation plant.5 5 This theory presupposes that a utility will increase its
output, and has the means to transmit and distribute the manufactured
electricity. Thus, a monopoly does not necessarily represent the least
expensive way to produce electricity, provided, however, that utilities
have access to transmission and distribution facilities.
C. Transmission
Transmission refers to the movement of bulk power between utilities,
or between the generation facility and the ultimate distribution point.
Transmission of power between utilities is referred to as "wheeling." 56
Unlike generation, the economies of scale in transmission are large
enough that it remains, and always will remain, a natural monopoly.5 7
Accounting data suggests that transmission is the least important link in
the system, representing only fifteen percent of total plant and less than
two percent of total electricity operating and maintenance expenses.5 ,
To evaluate properly the importance of this element of the industry,
however, one must evaluate the function it serves, not the revenue it
commands. Transmission is the link between manufacture and sale.
Further, the manufacturer cannot store electricity. If a manufacturer
cannot move its electricity from the generation plant to the consumer,
there is no incentive to enter the electricity industry or increase genera-
tion capacity. Access to transmission lines, therefore, is imperative for
the generation sector.
In addition to interconnection of generation plants and connection
with distribution centers, transmission lines have another crucial func-
tion; they are the arteries for efficient power coordination and catalysts to
further construction.59 Utilities are aware of the substantial economies
55. For example, consider a generator that attains its decreasing marginal cost at an output of
10,000 megawatts and has an overall output of 100,000 megawatts. One can say that the generator
reaches decreasing marginal cost at 10% of its output capacity. If, however, the same generation
plant could produce 200,000 megawatts, it would reach its decreasing marginal cost at a level of 5%.
56. The Supreme Court defined wheeling as the "transfer by direct transmission or displace-
ment [of] electric power from one utility to another over the facilities of an intermediate utility."
Otter Tail Power Co. v. United States, 410 U.S. 366, 368 (1973).
57. See P. JOSKOW & R. SCHMALENSEE, supra note 4 at 60, 62, 65.
58. Id. at 62-63.
59. Id. at 63-77.
1989]
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of scale associated with transmission and will consider the location of the
distribution grids before investing millions into one particular area.60
Also, substantial vertical and horizontal integration61 of these assets oc-
curs within the electricity business. When suggesting a potential scheme
of deregulation, scholars and law makers must remain cognizant of this
cooperation between power plants. In short, to be successful a deregula-
tion plan should take advantage of the present coordination attempts of
the utilities.
D. Distribution
Distribution is the low voltage movement of electricity to the ultimate
consumer.62 Like transmission services, distribution is a decreasing cost
industry and thereby a natural monopoly.63 Because the economies of
scale are so dense, more than one distribution system for the same area
would be impractical.
Transmission and distribution thus remain natural monopolies." For
a new manufacturer to compete, it would have to construct new distribu-
tion lines parallel to existing ones.65 The consequences of this unneeded
construction is to increase the cost to the ultimate consumer. If, how-
ever, independent power producers (I.P.P.'s) actually had access to ex-
isting transmission and distribution facilities, competition could exist on
the generation level, thereby decreasing the cost to the consumer. Fur-
ther, competition at this level would also reduce the need for regula-
tion.66 Because firms would vie for customers, there would be no need to
regulate rates; the supply and demand forces of the market would per-
form the necessary rate maintenance.
60. Fuller, Cogeneration and Small Power Production: Florida's Approach to Decentralized Gen-
eration 9 NovA L.L 25, 27-29 (1984).
61. Integration refers to the relationship between entities. To say that a firm is vertically inte.
grated means that the same firm owns the generation, transmission and distribution facilities. To say
that firms are horizontally integrated means that various firms in one of the three areas participate as
one. Essentially, horizontal integration is coordination on a smaller level. P. JosKow & R.
SCHMALENSEE, supra note 4, at 11-23.
62. Id. at 59.
63. Id. at 62, 64-65.
64. Id. at 62.
65. Id.
66. Parenthetically, virtually all transmission of electricity falls within the definition of "inter-
state commerce," and is therefore subject to exclusive F.E.R.C. regulation. Florida Power & Light
Co., 29 Fed. Energy Reg. Comm'n Rep. (CCH) 1 61,140 (1984) (asserting exclusive federal jurisdic-
tion over virtually all transmission service in Florida).
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The problem, however, is that utilities have already constructed, paid
for, and maintained existing lines. Understandably, they are unwilling to
provide others access to the lines for fear of eroding their monopolistic
position. The utilities argue that if they provide wheeling services, the
I.P.P.'s could take advantage of the utilities' investment to the utilities'
detriment.67 The premise for this argument is that it does not cost the
same amount to provide electrical service to all customers. For example,
it costs less to provide service to a customer in a downtown area where
there is an abundance of customers as opposed to providing power to the
single customer in a rural area. Utilities average the cost among all their
customers and charge all the same rate.68
The utilities maintain that an I.P.P. would use the utility's lines to
wheel power to a customer who would normally purchase electricity
from the wheeling utility which owns the line.69 Because the I.P.P. is
charging a cheaper rate and using the utility's existing wheeling lines, the
I.P.P. is benefiting twice. Not only is it avoiding constructing its own
lines, it is skimming the cheapest customers because it is not required to
serve the more expensive customers. 70 This decreases its average cost,
and the I.P.P. can therefore supply electricity at a significantly lower
cost.
E. Pooling/Coordination
As the electrical industry grew, power companies realized that if they
coordinated their generation and transmission systems across larger ar-
eas (as opposed to one distribution area), they could produce and deliver
power in a more cost effective and efficient manner.71 This coordination
67. 2 A. KAHN, THE ELEMENTS OF REGULATION: PRINCIPLES AND INSTITUTIONS 220-46
(1971).
68. Id.
69. This is a similar concern that arose in telecommunications long distance regulation. See,
e.g., Copelard & Severn, Price Theory and Telecommunications Regulation: A Dissenting View 3
YALE J. ON REG. 53 (1985); Kahn & Shaw, Current Issues in Telecommunications Regulation: Pric-
ing, 4 YALE J. ON REG. 191 (1987).
70 A. KAHN, supra note 67 at 220-46.
71. S. BREYER & P. MACAvoY, supra note 22, at 91, 94-107. By coordination, utilities save
directly in six cost areas: operating costs, reserve costs, costs for meeting peak demands, generating
costs, transmission reliability costs, and environmental costs. Breyer and MacAvoy have described
the cost savings of pooling. What follows is a summary of their description.
Utilities minimize operating costs when they adopt a central dispatch system. A central dispatch
system is a program aimed at using the cheapest electricity manufactured among a number of utili-
ties. The utilities calculate the marginal cost of producing energy at certain output levels. The
utilities then supply the least expensive electricity; when that generator is running at capacity, the
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manifested itself in the form of "power pooling."72 Pooling refers to co-
ordination on a smaller scale. If a firm produces more than 10,000 mega-
watts, it can economically and efficiently generate and transmit energy.73
Firms manufacturing less than 10,000 megawatts, however, enter into
agreements to capitalize on the larger economies of scale, integrating ver-
tically as well as horizontally.
Coordination promotes competition and rate reduction because each
member of the pool has a number of sources from which to draw.74 That
is, if one member of the pool suffers a mechanical breakdown at the gen-
eration level, another member of the pool can supply the needed electric-
next least expensive generator is "fired up" and it operates until it is at capacity. The process is
repeated until all generators are running at full capacity.
Reserve costs refers to the amount it costs a utility to keep extra capacity in times when demand
exceeds supply or when generators need repair and maintenance. If utilities coordinated their opera-
tions, they could stagger their maintenance schedules and, therefore, all the utilities in the system
would need less reserve capacity.
Costs for meeting peak demands are those costs associated with providing electricity when de-
mand is highest, e.g., on a hot summer day or a bitter cold night. If utilities in two time zones have
peak demands at different times, they may share the equipment needed to meet the varying times of
demand.
Coordination can also decrease generating costs. Although larger plants (400,000 kilowatts) man-
ufacture electricity most cheaply, a large generator also requires a large back-up unit. Further,
larger generators break down more frequently than smaller ones. Many intercoordinated smaller
generation units can meet the same demand as a large one and therefore meet a larger demand.
Transmission reliability costs refer to those costs associated with supplying electricity in those few
seconds between the breakdown of a generator and the start-up of the reserve generators. Because
all generators will not breakdown at the same instant, if they are interconnected, they can share the
same source of this power.
Intercoordination among utilities can also mitigate the environmental impact of the energy busi-
ness. The manufacture of energy affects the environment: plants burning fossil fuels pollute the air,
nuclear plants near adjacent water ways, dams and hydro-electric plants irritate the environment.
With coordination, firms will produce less total energy, and the total impact will be less. Id.
72. Id. There are two types of pools, tight pools and loose pools. As the names suggest, tight
pools compel strict coordination requirements upon the members, including capacity requirements
and central dispatch of electricity. Approximately 30% of all pools are tight.
Loose pools, however, impose the same restrictions on coordination in planning and operation but
they are more lenient with respect to central dispatch. The essential distinction between the two is
that a tight pool operates more like a single entity than loose pools.
Power pooling arrangements reduce costs compared to the cost of electricity absent coordination.
The evidence, however, is inconclusive whether the savings from further coordination would out-
weigh the costs. Id. at 97-101, 109-110.
73. See P. JOSKOW & R. SCHMALENSEE, supra note 4, at 65, 66-77.
74. Smaller pools have as little as five members while the larger ones have as many as thirty
members. One coordination group in the Midwest and the South has eight major electricity produ-
cers and twenty-six smaller producers with a capacity of less than 1000 megawatts. S. BREYER & P.
MAcovy, supra note 22, at 103, table 4-2.
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ity, curing the temporary deficit. This cooperation breeds competition
because buyers and sellers realize that there are more than one generator
and transmitter in the market. Buyers will search for the cheapest en-
ergy and sellers will try to produce the cheapest form of energy. Further,
competition is healthy for the electricity business because firms will strive
to produce and distribute power in the most cost effective manner. Utili-
ties will thus develop new technologies to serve a broader client base.
Technology and competition feed one another: the more competition, the
more advanced the technology, and the more advanced the technology,
the more electricity is sold, which in turn, breeds more competition.
The ultimate beneficiary of this new competition is the end consumer.
In the early years of electricity, utilities were aware that the F.P.C. set
rates at the utility's cost of production plus a reasonable rate of return.
The utilities had no incentive to produce energy more efficiently because
they knew they would always recoup their costs due to the rate structure.
This result prompted Congress to pass legislation granting F.E.R.C. the
power to regulate the transmission of power.7"
III. P.U.R.P.A.
In P.U.R.P.A., sections 20276 and 203, 7 7 Congress gave the F.E.R.C.
jurisdiction over energy transmission. One of the main thrusts of
P.U.R.P.A. is to encourage the development of cogeneration 78 and
I.P.P.'s, via state implementation of broad guidelines.79 While the state
75. See supra notes 5-9 and accompanying text.
76. 16 U.S.C. 824i (1982).
77. 16 U.S.C. § 824j (1982), states:
(a) Unjust or preferential rates, etc. Whenever the Commission, after a hearing had upon
its own motion or upon complaint, shall find that any rate, charge, or classification, de-
manded, observed, charged, or collected by any public utility for any transmission or sale
subject to the jurisdiction of the Commission, or that any rule, regulation, practice, or
contract affecting such rate, charge, or classification is unjust, unreasonable, unduly dis-
criminatory or preferential, the Commission shall determine the just and reasonable rate,
charge, classification, rule, regulation, practice, or contract to be thereafter observed and in
force, and shall fix the same by order.
Id.
78. 16 U.S.C. § 824a-3 (1982) states in pertinent part: "(a) mhe Commission shall prescribe
... such rules as it determines necessary to encourage cogeneration .. "
79. Section 210 of P.U.R.P.A. delegates to state public utilities commissions the responsibility
of executing the F.E.R.C. regulations. The Public Utility Commissions' primary responsibility is to
set the rates that the utilities may charge. The statute states in pertinent part:
The rules prescribed under subsection (a) of this section shall insure that, in requiring any
electric utility to offer to purchase electric energy from any qualifying cogeneration facility
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public utility commissions have pre-eminent regulatory discretion,
P.U.R.P.A. directs public utility behavior in three ways.
First, F.E.R.C. may require a utility to interconnect I.P.P.'s with the
utility's own distribution and transmission grids."0 The I.P.P.'s must be
"qualifying facilities"" l and the F.E.R.C. may require the utility to wheel
only to the extent that it will serve an existing contract. Second,
P.U.R.P.A. bars a public utility from setting discriminatory or burden-
some rates for backup power.s2 This is to prevent utilities from squeez-
or qualifying cogeneration facility or qualifying small power production facility, the rates
for such purchase-
(1) shall be just and reasonable to the electric consumers of the electric utility and in
the public interest, and
(2) shall not discriminate against qualifying cogenerators or qualifying small power
producers. No such rule prescribed under subsection (a) of this section shall provide
for a rate which exceeds the incremental cost to the electric utility of alternate electric
energy.
16 U.S.C. § 824a-3(b) (1985). See Consolidated Edison Co. of New York v. Public Service Comm'n,
98 A.D.2d 337, 379, 471 N.Y.S.2d 684, 686 (1983); 16 U.S.C. § 824a-3(a)(1982). See also American
Paper Inst., Inc. v. American Elec. Power Serv. Corp., 461 U.S. 402, 404-06 (1983).
80. 18 C.F.R. § 292.303(c) (1988).
(c) Obligation to interconnect. (1) Subject to paragraph (c)(2) of this section, any elec-
tric utility shall make such interconnections with any qualifying facility as may be neces-
sary to accomplish purchases or sales under this subpart. The obligation to pay for any
interconnection costs shall be determined in accordance with § 292.306.
(2) No electric utility is required to interconnect with any qualifying facility if, solely by
reason of purchase or sales over the interconnection, the electric utility would become
subject to regulation as a public utility under Part II of the Federal Power Act.
Id.
81. P.U.R.P.A.'retained the original Federal Power Act definition of qualifying utility: "(A)
small power production facility: means a facility which (i) produces electric energy solely by the use,
as a primary energy source, of biomass, waste, renewable resources, geothermal resources, or any
combination thereof;" 16 U.S.C. § 796 (17)(A)(i) (1982).
82. 18 C.F.R. § 292.305 (1988). § 292.305 states:
Rates for sales. (a) General rules. (1) Rates for sales:
(i) Shall be just and reasonable and in the public interest; and
(ii) Shall not discriminate against any qualifying facility in comparison to rates for sales
to other customers served by the electric utility....
(b) Additional Services to be Provided to qualifying Facilities. (1) Upon request of a
qualifying facility, each electric utility shall provide:
(i) Supplementary power;
(ii) Back-up power;
(iii) Maintenance power; and
(iv) Interruptible power.
Congress' rationale is that generators must have sufficient backup power in case the generator
suffers a mechanical breakdown. Fuller, Cogeneration, & Small Power Production: Florida's Ap-
proach to Decentralized Generation, 9 NOVA L. R. 25, 30 (1984). If the public utilities supply back
up power at an exorbitant price, they deny affordable back up power to I.P.P.'s and prevent them
from entering the market. Thus, by charging astronomical rates for back up power, the public utility
can keep the I.P.P.'s out of the market. The utilities therefore retain their monopoly.
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ing out I.P.P.'s by overcharging them for necessary back up power.
Third, P.U.R.P.A. requires the public utility to purchase power from a
qualifying facility at the utility's "avoided cost," 3 in other words, the
amount of money the utility would have spent to generate power, but for
its purchase from the I.P.P.8 4
Although P.U.R.P.A. attempts to encourage the independent genera-
tion of electricity, it does not give the F.E.R.C. the critical power to in-
sure a competitive environment. The F.E.R.C. may order a public utility
to wheel energy in only very limited circumstances, giving I.P.P.'s no
real means to deliver their electricity. Until I.P.P.'s have equal access to
transmission and distribution, they cannot effectively compete. The
economies of scale associated with transmission are too immense to allow
an I.P.P. to enter the market effectively. The Supreme Court in Otter
Tail Power Co. v. United States5 perpetuated this situation by declaring
the F.E.R.C. powerless to order wheeling. 6
The Otter Tail case involved a Sherman Act suit brought by the federal
government against the Otter Tail Power Company (Otter Tail), a large
public utility. 7 Otter Tail possessed the only facilities to transport elec-
tricity from a competing seller to Otter Tail's own customers.88 The gov-
ernment argued that Otter Tail violated the antitrust laws by refusing to
transport power.89 Otter Tail contended that the Federal Power Act dis-
placed the antitrust laws because it gave the F.P.C. the power to order
the defendant to transmit power, but the F.P.C. simply had not yet exer-
cised this right.9' The Court disagreed. It held that the F.P.C. did not
have power to order wheeling,91 and therefore, was not displaced by the
Federal Power Act and the antitrust laws.
83. 18 C.F.R. § 292. 101(bX6) (1988) provides: "'Avoided costs' means the incremental costs to
an electric utility of electric energy or capacity or both which, but for the purchase from the qualify-
ing facility or qualifying facilities, such utility would generate itself or purchase from another
source."
84. P.U.R.P.A. § 210 states in pertinent part: "No such rule prescribed under subsection (a) of
this section shall provide for a rate which exceed the incremental cost to the electric utility of alter-
native electric energy." 16 U.S.C. § 824a-3(b)(1982). Note though that the different state utility
commissions interpret this concept inconsistently. See, e.g., Wooster, Cogeneration: Revival Through
Legislation?, 87 DICK. L. REv. 705 (1983).
85. 410 U.S. 366 (1973).
86. Id. at 375.
87. Id. at 368.
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. Id. at 372-75.
91. Id.
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Some litigants have argued that because F.E.R.C. can control rates for
transmission services, F.E.R.C. also has the authority under Federal
Power Act section 202(a) to require the utility to wheel for any genera-
tor.92 The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia flatly rejected
this assertion in Richmond Power & Light v. Federal Energy Regulatory
Commission. In Richmond Power, the court held that wheeling is volun-
tary and the commission has no power to require wheeling indirectly
through its rate regulation powers.93 The Fifth Circuit also rejected a
variation of this argument in Florida Power & Light v. FER C.94 Florida
Power involved the issue of whether F.E.R.C. could compel Florida
Power to include a stated rate policy in all future transmission agree-
ments under Federal Power Act Section 205.95 F.E.R.C. argued that its
ability to do so transformed Florida Power into a common carrier,96 and
thus, F.E.R.C. could order it to wheel on behalf of an I.P.P. The court
rejected this argument. 97 Both cases held that while a court may order a
utility to wheel under the antitrust laws, F.E.R.C. (under sections 202
and 205) may not.98
A. F.E.R.C. s Power to Order Wheeling
Although Federal Power Act sections 202 and 205 do not authorize
F.E.R.C. to issue a wheeling order, P.U.R.P.A. sections 202, 203, and
204 do.99 The difficulty is that F.E.R.C. may only do so after an exten-
sive finding of fact. To order wheeling, F.E.R.C. must first find that the
proposed order is "in the public interest,"'" and "it is not likely to result
in a reasonably ascertainable and uncompensated economic loss for any
electric utility" (or I.P.P.).1° ! In addition, the wheeling order may not
work any "undue burden on a utility" or (I.P.P.); °2 and it must "con-
92. 574 F.2d 610 (D.C. Cir. 1978). Section 202(a) is codified at 16 U.S.C. 824a(a).
93. Id. at 619-20. The court also held that for antitrust purposes a refusal to wheel is not per se
discriminatory. Id. at 623-24.
94. 660 F.2d 668 (5th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1156 (1983).
95. Id. at 676-77. Federal Power Act § 205(c) is codified at 16 U.S.C. 824d(c).
96. Id. at 677-78.
97. 660 F.2d at 677-78.
98. See 660 F.2d at 677-70; 574 F.2d at 619-22. Nor did F.E.R.C.'s predecessor, the Federal
Power Commission have power to order wheeling. See City of Paris v. Kentucky Util. Co., 41 Fed.
Energy Reg. Comm'n Rep. (CCH) 45 (1969).
99. 16 U.S.C. §§ 824i; 824j; 824k.
100. Id. § 824j(a)(1).
101. Id. § 824k(a)(1).
102. Id. § 824k(a)(2).
[Vol. 67:435
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol67/iss2/6
WHEELING UNDER P.U.R.P.A.
serve a significant amount of energy, '  or "significantly promote the
efficient use of facilities and resources,"'" or "improve the reliability of
any electric utility system to which the order applies." 10 5 The order also
must "not unreasonably impair the ability of any electric utility ... to
render adequate service to its customers,"'1 6 and it must "preserve ex-
isting competitive relationships." 107 Finally, the order must not require
replacing electric energy currently provided pursuant to contract or rate
standards 0 8 and may not be "inconsistent with any state law which gov-
erns the retail market areas of electric utilities."10 9 F.E.R.C. must also
find that the requesting applicant formally notified the utility of its re-
fusal. 10 This battery of requirements is a two-edged sword. The utilities
are hesitant to refuse wheeling requests because of the treble damages
that the statute allows. On the other hand, because F.E.R.C. must make
extensive factual findings, I.P.P.'s are hesitant to seek a wheeling order
because the request is rarely granted. There is thus no incentive for
I.P.P.'s to incur the necessary litigation costs to compel wheeling. Even
though F.E.R.C. has a limited degree of power to order wheeling, the
power goes largely unused and unchallenged. 11
Within the past year, however, F.E.R.C. has relied on its power to
approve mergers between utility companies to require wheeling. The
Federal Power Act authorizes F.E.R.C. to approve utility mergers as
long as the merger serves the public interest. Section 203 of the Act
further provides that F.E.R.C. may make supplemental orders "for good
cause... as it may find necessary and appropriate." '112 F.E.R.C. used
section 203 to require wheeling access as a condition of approval of a
merger between Pacificorporation and Utah Power & Light Company.
13
Although F.E.R.C. generally may not require by condition a producer to
103. Id. § 824j(a)(2)(A).
104. Id. § 824j(a)(2)(B).
105. Id. § 824j(a)(2)(C).
106. Id. § 824k(a)(3).
107. Id. § 824j(c)(1).
108, Id. § 824j(c)(2)(A),(B).
109. Id. § 824j(c)(3).
110. Id. § 824j(a).
111. See, e.g., Southeastern Power Admin. v. Kentucky Util. Co., 25 Fed. Energy Reg. Comm'n.
Rep. (CCH) 61,204 (1983).
112. Originally, the "necessary and appropriate" clause was not intended to covering wheeling.
Later the clause was amended to prevent abuses in the industry. Roberts, New Slant on the Law
Imposed on Utility Merger, L.A. Daily Journal, Nov. 1, 1988 at 7, col. 5.
113. Id.
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do something, a challenge to this authority could prove futile. For exam-
ple, if the utility did successfully challenge a wheeling order under this
scheme, F.E.R.C. simply could refuse to authorize the merger.
B. Antitrust Issues
If an I.P.P. could show anti-competitive or monopolistic practices re-
sulting from a utility's refusal to wheel, section 2 of the Sherman Act
could provide relief.114 The Supreme Court addressed this issue in Otter
Tail Power Co. v. United States.115 The Court held that even if F.E.R.C.
could not order a utility to wheel under the Federal Power Act, a court
could.' 1 6
Unfortunately, many problems arise in using a Sherman Antitrust
cause of action in a regulated industry. Although the case law on this
subject varies from industry to industry, 11 7 the law has long provided
certain natural monopolies with exempt status from the antitrust laws. I18
In addition, an I.P.P. has considerable logistical obstacles in bringing this
type of litigation. Given the costs associated with bringing an antitrust
action combined with the time and the uncertainty of success, the risk is
so great that it dissuades potential plaintiffs. 19
One promising but still uncertain1 20 theory that an I.P.P. could use to
convince a court to order wheeling is the essential facility doctrine.
121
114. 15 U.S.C. § 2 (1982). The Sherman Antitrust Act levies a fee or imprisonment on those
who "monopolize, or attempt to monopolize, or combine or conspire with any other person or per-
sons, to monopolize any part of the trade or commerce among the several States." Id.
115. 410 U.S. 366.
116. See supra notes 77-83 and accompanying text.
117. L. SULLIVAN, ANTrriusT, 743-45 (1977).
118. See, eg., Keogh v. Chicago N. & W. Ry., 260 U.S. 156 (1922) (holding that railroad rate
regulatory scheme precluded private party's antitrust action alleging conspiracy to fix rates); United
States v. Pan American World Airway Inc., 371 U.S. 296, 304-305 (1962) (holding that § 41 of the
1938 Civil Aeronautics Act gave the Board broad jurisdiction over carriers, as far as most facets of
federal control (including antitrust action) are concerned). See also L. SULLIVAN, supra note 117 at
744.
119. See Byars v. Bluff City News Co., 609 F.2d 843, 846 (6th Cir. 1979).
120. The essential facilities doctrine has yet to be applied to regulated industries. It was first
used in 1911, in United States Y. Terminal R.R. Ass'n, 224 U.S. 383 (1911), in a dispute involving a
railroad bridge. Subsequent to the Terminal Railroad case, courts applied the doctrine to (among
other things) selling time, American Fed'n of Tobacco Growers v. Neal., 183 F.2d 869 (4th Cir.
1950); and to warehouse space, GAMCO, Inc. v. Providence Fruit & Produce Bldg., 194 F.2d 484
(1st Cir.), cert. denied, 344 U.S. 817 (1952).
121. See generally Ratner, Should There by an Essential Facilities Doctrine, 21 U.C. DAVIS L.
REV. 327, 327-82 (1988); Werden, The Law & Economics of the Essential Facility Doctrine, 32 ST.
Louis U.L.J. 433, 433-80 (1987).
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This doctrine contemplates a company or group of companies that con-
trol a requisite element (essential facility) of a certain industry. If the
company refuses to grant access to the facility, a court would deem the
refusal anti-competitive and monopolistic behavior and therefore a viola-
tion of section 2 of the Sherman Act.1 2
2
When courts use the essential facilities doctrine, the threshold question
is always whether the facility is "essential." '123 Generally, the standard is
whether a potential market enterer could feasibly duplicate the facility
and whether the refusal of access precludes entry into the market. 124
Even if, however, a court found that a public utility controlled an essen-
tial facility and therefore possessed monopoly power, the court must also
find an abuse of monopoly power and an antitrust injury. 125
At least two circuits126 have abandoned the traditional market share
analysis 2 7 in unregulated industries antitrust litigation and have adopted
the essential facilities doctrine.128  Moreover, Justice Stewart's dissent in
Otter Tail urged the majority to employ the essential facility doctrine.
122. See MCI Communications Corp. v. American Tel. and Tel. Co., 708 F.2d 1081 (7th Cir.),
cert. denied, 464 U.S. 891 (1983); Byars v. Bluff City News Co., 609 F.2d 843 (6th Cir. 1979); Hecht
v. Pro-Football, Inc., 570 F.2d 982 (D.C. Cir. 1977), cert denied, 436 U.S. 956 (1978).
123. Hecht v. Pro-Football, Inc., 570 F.2d 982, 992 (D.C. Cir. 1977), cert denied, 436 U.S. 956
(1978) (if a corporation possesses an essential facility that cannot be reproduced, the utility has the
power to restrict, indeed prohibit, any entry to the market).
124. Id.
125. See L. SULLIVAN, supra note 117, at 743-46.
126. The Fifth and Seventh Circuits have expressly rejected the market share analysis with re-
spect to regulated industries. See infra note 129.
127. In the traditional market share analysis, a court focuses on the portion of the market that
an alleged monopolist controls. See E. SULLIVAN & H. HOVENKAMP, ANTrrRusT LAW POLICY
AND PROCEDURE, 407 (1986).
128. Twice in 1980 the Fifth Circuit used the essential facility doctrine. In Almeda Mall, Inc. v.
Housten Lighting & Power Co., 615 F.2d 343 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 870 (1980), shopping
mall developers sued the local utility, alleging that the utility's refusal to sell electricity through a
single meter for resale to mall tenants violated antitrust laws. Although the court ruled for the
utility, it stated that: "monopolization cases involving such regulated industries are special in nature
and require close scrutiny [because] regulation is considered an adequate replacement for the lack of
competition. [Further,] controlling a predominant share of the relevant market cannot infer the
traditional monopoly power associated with an entity outside the regulated field." (emphasis added).
Id. at 354.
In Mid-Texas Communications Systems Inc. v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 615 F.2d 1372 (5th
Cir.), cert. denied sub nom. Woodlands Telecommunications Corp. v. Southwestern Bell Tele. Corp.,
449 U.S. 912 (1980), an independent telephone company sued AT&T, alleging that AT&T's refusal
to provide toll interconnections violated the antitrust laws. The court held that the trial court's
refusal to instruct the jury to consider regulatory dynamics was reversible error. Id. at 1387-90.
In MCI Communications Corp. v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 708 F.2d 1081 (7th Cir.), cert
denied, 464 U.S. 891 (1983), MCI sued AT&T on four counts all under the Sherman Antitrust Act.
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Justice Stewart argued that a mechanical application of section 2 of the
Sherman Antitrust Act does not lend itself to the difficulties of the regu-
lated industries. The Otter Tail court, however, refused to apply such an
analysis.
Thus, because of the high degree of expense and length of the litiga-
tion, as well as the uncertainty of success of the essential facility doctrine,
I.P.P.'s are generally reluctant to bring a cause of action based on the
Sherman Act. 12
9
There is a colorable argument that courts should not even involve
themselves with the decision of ordering a utility to wheel. Congress del-
egated the responsibility of regulating electricity to the F.E.R.C.. Be-
cause F.E.R.C. is intimately involved with the electric industry on a day-
to-day basis, it is more familiar with the esoteric peculiarities of that in-
dustry. 130 Judges, on the other hand, are essentially laymen with respect
to any given industry, and their knowledge may be limited. Simply
stated, judges are sometimes not equipped with the crucial knowledge
necessary to evaluate a certain issue or problem. While a judge may base
her decision in the hyper-technical industry on sound legal reasoning, she
may very well be amiss in the practical realities of the abstruse techno-
logical and economic issues necessary to arrive at a fair and equitable
result.
IV. PROPOSAL/POSSIBLE REFORM
There are many proposals for deregulating the energy industry' 3' but
The Seventh Circuit held "such a heavy reliance on market share statistics is likely to be an inaccu-
rate or misleading indicator of monopoly power in a regulatory setting." Id. at 1106-07.
See also Watson & Brunner, Monopolization by Regulated "Monopolies": The Search for Substan-
tive Standards, 22 ANTITRUST BULL. 599 (1977).
129. See Norton and Early, Limitations on the Obligation to Provide Access to Electric Transmis.
sion and Distribution Lines, 5 ENERGY L.J 47, 63 (1984).
130. This argument falls under the administrative law concept of primary jurisdiction, i.e.
whether an agency has jurisdiction over a dispute before a court should properly hear it. Generally,
if a court has determined that an issue or a dispute is actually within the authority of an administra-
tive agency, it will defer any decision until the agency has had the opportunity to rule on the issue.
See R. PIERCE, S. SHAPIRO, & P. VERKUIL, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND PROCESS §§ 5.8, 5,8.3
(1985). Because F.E.R.C. should have the power to order wheeling, an antitrust case based on a
refusal to wheel should be deferred pending the agency's determination.
131. See, eg., S. BREYER & P. MACAVOY, supra note 22, at 89-121 (suggesting that government
regulates many mergers so that the electric industry is controlled by 10-15 large firms); EDISON
ELEC. INST. ALTERNATIVE MODELS OF ELECTRIC POWER DEREGULATION (1982) (reviewing stud-
ies of deregulation and competition in the electric utility industry); EDISON ELEC. INST., DEREGU-
LATION OF ELECTRIC UTILITIES: A SURVEY OF MAJOR CONCEPTS AND ISSUES (1981) (summary of
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they generally fall into one of three categories: divestiture, deregulation,
or a mixture of the two. This section of the Note will evaluate three such
recommendations.
A. Complete Deregulation
Complete deregulation would not improve the I.P.P.'s present predica-
ment for several reasons. Because generators reach their decreasing cost
of production at a relatively low output level 132 one region could feasibly
support a competitive environment of more than one generator. Thus,
the problem does not lie with the generation sector of the industry. With
respect to transmission and distribution facilities, however, the econo-
mies of scale are great enough to preclude any realistic entry in the mar-
ket.133 Because deregulation would permit utilities to restrict or prohibit
access to the existing facilities, I.P.P.'s would still have difficulties in sell-
ing their electricity.
134
B. Vertical Divestiture
The above analysis does not address the question of divesting the elec-
tric industry. This proposal envisions the creation of three separate
major proposals for deregulating the electric utility industry); A. KAHN, THE ECONOMICS OF REGU-
LATION: PRINCIPLES AND INSTITUTIONS 250 (1970) (arguing that the "ideal would be to reduce the
scope of regulation insofar as possible, to applying the LRMC test of remunerativeness, as a floor,
and protecting from exploitation, those many customers who, inevitably, will continue to lack access
to sufficient competitive alternative."); WEISS, ANTITRUST IN THE ELECTRIC POWER INDUSTRY, IN
PROMOTING COMPETITION IN REGULATED MARKETS 135 (A. Phillips ed. 1975) (arguing that de-
regulation may be best served in copious interpretation of antitrust law); Cohen, Efficiency and Com-
petition in the Electric-Power Industry, 88 YALE L.J. 1511, 1538-1546 (1979) (arguing that a regional
dispatch system would best serve electricity supply demand); Meeks, Concentration in the Electric
Power Industry: The Impact of Antitrust Policy, 72 COLUM. L. REv. 64, 129-31 (1972) (suggesting
that the government forbear the traditional question of regulate vs. non-regulate and concentrate
instead on using antitrust legislation to best effect far and equal distribution of power); Miller, A
Needed Reform in the Organization and Regulation of the Interstate Electric Power Industry, 38
FORDHAM L. REV. 635 (1970) (arguing for concentration responsibility for planning, constructing,
and operation of generation and transmission facilities in interstate and foreign commerce in inves-
tor-owned regional public utility corporations); Olds, The Economic Planning Function Under Public
Regulation, 48 AM. ECON. REv. 553, 561 (1958) (arguing that economic planning under regulation
will separate the functions of wholesale power supply from the function of distribution of electricity
thus giving full effect to mass-production and mass-sales principles which have proved successful in
other American businesses); Berry, The Case for Competition in the Electric Utility Industry, PUB.
UTIL. FORT., Sept. 16, 1982, at 13.
132. See P. JOSKOw & R. SCHMALENSEE, supra note 4, at 154-55.
133. Id. at 65-66, 154-55.
134. Id. at 195.
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industries: generation,1 35 transmission, 36 and distribution. 137 Theoreti-
cally, Congress could completely deregulate the generation business.
The transmission and distribution industries could either be regulated,
state purchased, or transferred into common carriers.1 3 Given the eco-
nomic and technological characteristics unique to each industry, this
proposal seems appealing. Under this proposal, each industry would
warrant distinct and separate regulatory schemes. Further, one company
need not control all three industries to maximize profits. 139 Under fur-
ther scrutiny, however, this proposal's inefficiencies surface.1 40 An un-
derstanding of the economics involved is essential to a discussion of the
problems.
Essentially, economists divide transactions into two types, discrete and
long term relational.'41  Discrete transactions refer to a long term con-
tractual relationship where the parties can anticipate all emergency costs.
Contracts, then, are a perfectly logical method to incorporate a discrete
transaction. This is not true, however, for long term relational transac-
tions because they involve uncertainty with respect to the forecast of fu-
ture costs.142 Long term relational transactions have three specific
characterizations: 1) they involve sunken costs 2) they have repeating
transactions between parties and 3) the future is uncertain with respect to
performance of the contract. 43 The costs associated with the contract
formation are so high as to render the transaction unprofitable. 
144
If the industry were vertically divested, transactions between genera-
tors and transmitters would assume the characteristics of relational
transactions: 45 sunken costs, repeating transactions, and future uncer-
135. See supra notes 49-55 and accompanying text.
136. See supra notes 56-61 and accompanying text.
137. See supra motes 62-70 and accompanying text.
138. See S. BREYER & P. MACAVOY, supra note 22, at 119-21. See also Otter Tail Power Co. v.
United States, 410 U.S. 366, 374 (1972) (The Court reiterated congressional intent to delete a com-
mon carrier provision making it the duty of every public utility to transmit energy per reasonable
request.); H.R. 5423, 74th Cong., 1st Sess., § 1725, and S. Rep. No. 621, 74th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1983).
139. Id.
140. P. JosKow & R. SCHMALENSEE, supra note 4, at 4, 26-29, 63, 109-38, 204-05, 208.
141. Williamson, Transaction-Cost Economics: The Governance of Contractual Relations, 22 J.L.
& ECON. 233, 241-42 (1979).
142. Id.
143. Id. at 246-47.
144. Id. at 245-46.
145. See P. JosKow & R. SCHMALENSEE, supra note 4, at 26-29, 112-13.
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tainty with respect to performance of the contract. 146 Due to the uncer-
tainty involved, the contracting process between those two utilities would
be cumbersome, expensive and inefficient.
C. Horizontal Divestiture of Generation
One scholar argues that horizontal divestiture of generation facilities,
coupled with appropriate regulatory measures, would result in a perfect
equilibrium of supply and demand. 47 This proposal neglects the sub-
stantial savings exhibited by the increased coordination in the system.148
If Congress prevented generation facilities from cooperating to maximize
resources and efficiency while minimizing costs, and allowed every utility
to work solely in its own interests, there might be more competition, but
probably at the ratepayers' expense.149
V. PROPOSAL
Given the previous analysis of the present state of affairs as well as
some of the tendered solutions, the most efficient and realistic method to
increase competition, while maintaining a fair rate schedule, is to amend
P.U.R.P.A.. To reach these goals, Congress must amend P.U.R.P.A. in
three areas.
The first amendment would give the F.E.R.C. more power to compel a
utility to wheel. Although rare circumstances allow F.E.R.C. to order
wheeling, the agency must wait for a private party (the bulk power
buyer) to bring a cause of action. The uncertainty of attaining an order,
the legal costs involved, and the burden of proof the I.P.P. must shoul-
der, leave hardly any incentive for an I.P.P. or a municipal corporation
to attempt to obtain wheeling order. Instead of a F.E.R.C. wheeling or-
der being an exception to the rule, the general rule ought to give
F.E.R.C. the power to mandate wheeling absent a showing of good cause
to the contrary, for example, a potentially overloaded system.
One author suggests that Congress ought to repeal the section requir-
ing F.E.R.C. to retain competition.150 While this proposal seems attrac-
tive at first blush, it is too broad. Congress would need only to modify
146. See supra note 123 and accompanying text.
147. See WEISS, supra note 131, at 136.
148. See supra Part II E.
149. Id.
150. See Note, Problems of Price and Transportation: Two Proposals to Encourage Competition
from Alternative Energy Sources, 10 HARV. ENv. L. Rnv. 345 (1986).
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the section, not repeal it. The statute states the F.E.R.C. should "pre-
serve competition." If the statute said "encourage," not "preserve," then
F.E.R.C. would arguably have more power to oblige a utility to wheel;
such an order would certainly "encourage competition."
The F.E.R.C. also should have the power legally to do what it at-
tempted in the Florida Power case. Congress should amend the Federal
Power Act or P.U.R.P.A. to explicitly allow the F.E.R.C. to structure a
rate schedule for wheeling services. Potential I.P.P.'s considering en-
trance into the market would then have the necessary information to
forecast costs and, therefore, make a more informed decision whether or
not to construct a generation plant.
It would also seem equitable to allow the utility to charge the same
amount for wheeling services that the I.P.P. charges for electricity, in
other words, marginal cost. The I.P.P. may only charge the avoided
costs or the amount the buying utility saved by not producing one more
unit of energy, or the "marginal savings." The logical scheme would
require the utility to charge only their marginal cost of wheeling the
power.
The final amendment of P.U.R.P.A. would require the wheeling utility
to wheel for any I.P.P. as long as providing such service would not have
an adverse impact on the transmission system. P.U.R.P.A. ought to give
F.E.R.C. the power to levy heavy fines on any utility wheeling discrimi-
natorily. Of course, the utility ought to have the chance to rebut the
charge of discrimination. The amendment would, however, set a strict
time limit on the utility's rebuttal. Absent such time limits, the utility
could stall, preventing the I.P.P. from seeking an order. The potential
lag time between a request, a refusal, a F.E.R.C. investigation and an
ultimate ruling could prove too much for an I.P.P. to endure.
When taken in its entirety, this proposal would ease entry into the
market by any potential I.P.P. If an I.P.P. had the requisite elements to
manufacture, transmit, and distribute electricity, the generation industry
would deregulate itself. Perfect competition could exist at the generation
level, not because of a congressional mandate, but because any entrepre-
neur with a novel way to manufacture and efficiently market electricity,
would be able to deliver his product. It is also highly unlikely that this
proposal will spawn the same problems which required Congress to regu-
late electricity in the 1930s. The transmission and distribution grids are
in place across the nation. At present, utilities serve the rural United
States as efficiently as the urban areas.
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The principle drawback of this proposal is the potential displacement
of electricity service to rural areas. Arguably, utilities may find it un-
profitable to serve sparsely populated areas and therefore discontinue ser-
vice. There are two answers to this argument. First, utilities are not
likely to sacrifice hundreds of millions of dollars already invested. If it
becomes unprofitable to provide electricity, the utilities may merely raise
their rates. Further, this proposal leaves the rate setting schemes intact.
That is, if an I.P.P. can provide power more cheaply than the investor
owned utility and the maximum rate allowed by F.E.R.C., then a com-
petitive environment will flourish. If, however, an investor owned utility
has no competition from an I.P.P., that does not leave the investor
owned utility free to set whatever rate it wishes; it still must comply with
F.E.R.C.'s enunciated rate scheme.
Another potential problem with this proposal is that an I.P.P. may still
skim the cheapest customers and render the utilities as mere transfers of
bulk power. Two remedies exist for this problem. First, the F.E.R.C.
could develop a type of sliding scale where the cost of wheeling electric-
ity would be inversely proportionate to the types and percentages of cer-
tain skimmed customers. If the F.E.R.C. found that there was a real and
dangerous potential that a utility could not operate profitably as a direct
result of wheeling energy for skimmed customers, then the F.E.R.C.
could either allow the utility to charge more for wheeling or it could
grant the utility the power to refuse to wheel. The scheme is consistent
with the spirit of this proposal. In other words, to place the burden on
the utility to prove why it should not have to wheel as opposed to requir-
ing the I.P.P. to carry the burden. It is also important to realize that the
I.P.P. may not be "skimming"; it simply may have developed a better
and more efficient way to manufacture and deliver energy. This new
technology will theoretically spur the public utility to develop new tech-
nologies so it may also efficiently and economically serve its customers.
VI. CONCLUSION
The most expeditious, economical, and simple method to deregulate
the generation industry is to amend P.U.R.P.A.. The status quo inher-
ently precludes any I.P.P. from entering the market, thereby retarding
growth and competition in the electricity industry. Because potential
I.P.P.'s are uncertain with respect to wheeling electricity from manufac-
ture to consumer, they are reluctant to invest millions of dollars in a
generation plant. This factor, coupled with the increasing costs associ-
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ated with constructing a large generation plant, leaves doubt as to the
future supply of electricity. If F.E.R.C. could order a utility to wheel on
behalf of another, competition would be fierce and electricity would re-
main affordable and abundant.
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